Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Diamond T. Developments, Inc. v. David R. Brown,
Chris Loock, and Chad Stokes : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. Darin Hammond; Smith Knowles, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold and Wiggins, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Diamond T. Developments v. Brown, No. 20070397 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/248

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DIAMOND T. DEVELOPMENTS, INC.;
Appellant,
v.

]
>
]

DAVID R. BROWN, CHRIS LOOCK
and CHAD STOKES,

]
;

Appellees.

Appellate Case No. 20070397-CA

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DIAMOND T. DEVELOPMENTS, INC.
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
Scott L. Wiggins
57 West 200 South, Ste 105
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellees

Smith Knowles, P.C.
M. Darin Hammond
4723 Harrison, Suite 200
Ogden,Utah 84403
Attorneys for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 3 0 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DIAMOND T. DEVELOPMENTS, INC.;
Appellant,
v.

]
)
]

DAVID R. BROWN, CHRIS LOOCK
and CHAD STOKES,

;
;

Appellees.

Appellate Case No. 20070397-CA

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DIAMOND T. DEVELOPMENTS, INC.
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
Scott L. Wiggins
57 West 200 South, Ste 105
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellees

Smith Knowles, P.C.
M. Darin Hammond
4723 Harrison, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Attorneys for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A
DISSOLVED CORPORATION CANNOT ENFORCE ITS
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS

1

THE ISSUE DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS A LEGAL
ISSUE ON WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN RULE

4

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY THE LAW CORRECTLY
TO THE FACTS AT HAND
5

IV.

THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF CONTRACT RIGHTS IS NOT
AN ATTEMPT TO RAISE A NEW
ISSUE

6

CONCLUSION

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

8

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-1405(2)
Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-102(26)
Utah Code Ann. Sec 16-10a-1405(2)(e)
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 and 101

Cases
Falconaero Enterprise v. Valley Investment Company, 395 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964)
Holman v. Callister, 905 p.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 174 P.3d 1,5 (Utah App. 2007)
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1187(1938)
Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah 2d 208, 487 P.2d 861, 862 (1971)
Massey v. Griffiths, 131 P.3d 243 (Utah 2005)
Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Utah 2006)

Other Authorities
19 C.J.S. Corporations §951
19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 2888
Rules
None
Treatises
None
Constitutional Provisions
None

ii

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A
DISSOLVED CORPORATION CANNOT ENFORCE ITS
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS.

This is a quiet title lawsuit challenging the procedure employed to
accomplish a county tax sale. The central issue of this appeal is whether or not the
district court erred in determining that Diamond T. Developments, Inc., a
dissolved corporation, could not enforce its contractual rights in a quiet title
action.

The general rule is that contracts of a corporation made prior to its

dissolution survive the dissolution and are enforceable.

See, 19 C.J.S.

Corporations § 951 and 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 2888. This is also the
principle which was followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Falconaero Enterprise
v. Valley Investment Company, 395 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). This is also the
existing statutory law. See, Utah Code Annotated § 16- 10a-1405(2). Since the
Falconaero decision was issued the Utah Court of Appeals issued the Holman v.
Callister, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ruling in which the Court stated that
a dissolved corporation could not enforce a malpractice claim. In the matter at
hand, the trial court misplaced reliance upon the Holman v. Callister decision.
With the trial court relying entirely upon the Holman decision, the trial court
misapplied the law relating to dissolution of corporations.

The district court

should have followed the Falconaero case.
Appellees have not attempted to distinguish the Falconaero case which
allowed a dissolved corporation to maintain a quiet title lawsuit. Appellees have
1

not even addressed that issue nor have they addressed Utah Code Annotated § 1610a-1405(2) which specifically states that dissolution of a corporation does not
prevent a proceeding by or against a dissolved corporation in its corporate name.
"Proceeding" is defined under Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-102(26) as
including a "civil suit, arbitration or mediation, and a criminal, administrative or
an investigatory action." Thus, the action of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. to
enforce contractual rights by way of a quiet title lawsuit is consistent with
applicable law.
The Falconaero decision is applicable to this case instead of the Holman
case because the right which Appellant seeks to enforce is a quiet title action based
upon a contractual right that arose prior to dissolution. The Falconaero case was
also a quiet title case. In fact, the Holman holding was very specific and narrowly
stated by concluding "that these statutes do not allow a dissolved corporation to
pursue claims for malpractice after it has ceased to exist in any manner as a
corporate entity."

There was no discussion of the Falconaero decision to

distinguish the holdings. The contractual right of Diamond T. Developments, Inc.
existed at the time of the improper tax sale. The improper tax sale occurred in
June 1999. It is undisputed that the interest of Diamond T. Developments was of
record at that time because the contract had been recorded as of September 1981.
R. 36. Weber County failed to even attempt to provide Diamond T. Developments
with notice of the upcoming tax sale. R. 37. Because its interest was of record and
because existing statutes at the time (Utah Code Ann. Sec 16-10a-1405(2)(e))
2

specifically authorize dissolved corporations to bring lawsuits in their corporate
name, the interest of Diamond T. Developments could not properly be cut off by
the procedure employed by Weber County and further the district court could not
properly rule that Diamond T. Developments, Inc. had no statutory right to bring
this action. 1
The district court did not properly analyze the central issue of this case,
made an incorrect ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and left nothing in
the case to try by virtue of its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. That
single ruling should be reversed and the case remanded. The trial court should
have applied the existing corporate statutes and further should have applied the
Falconaero case, rather than the Holman case.
The Appellee has failed to address the Falconaero case and the above
referenced Utah Code Sections. Appellees' failure to address these arguments is
indicative that said arguments are dispositive because Appellees have not
presented any case law or statutory law contrary to Appellant's position which is
that contracts made prior to dissolution can be enforced by that entity after
dissolution. This court should reverse the trial court's ruling and allow for further
consistent proceedings.

1 The old statute (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 and 101 (repealed 1992)) is not applicable because
Appellant's interest was of record in 1999 when the improper tax sale occurred. Appellant had no
knowledge of any invalid tax sale while the old statutes was in effect (up through 1992) and did not obtain
accrual of its cause of action until the improper tax sale took place in 1999.

3

II THE ISSUE DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS A LEGAL
ISSUE ON WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN RULE.

Appellee has argued that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this
matter. This argument fails because Appellant seeks review of the district court's
decision on the underlying motion for summary judgment. The effect of that
decision was to terminate the case because of the central issue of the statutory
right of the plaintiff to even proceed. Appellant believes that the district court
erred in issuing its ruling on the motion for summary judgment based upon
interpretation of the law and is entitled to a review thereof. This is a legal, not a
factual issue. The essential facts brought forward to the date of the motion for
summary judgment are not in dispute. The effect of the law or how the law is
interpreted is what is in dispute.
Appellant needs to be able to obtain appellate review of that decision which
Appellant believes to be contrary to law. If Appellee's jurisdictional argument
were adopted, Appellant would have no effective right to appeal. In other words,
this court should not dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, because
the jurisdictional question is without merit, this court should reach the merits of
this appeal.

Under Utah appellate law, appellate courts have jurisdiction to

entertain an appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment if it involves a
legal issue. See, Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 5 (Utah
App. 2007). Because the issue decided by the district court was based upon
undisputed facts and it is a question or law, this Court has the ability to review the
4

trial court's decision and determine whether or not that legal decision was in error.
Therefore, this court does have jurisdiction to proceed to hear this appeal on the
merits.

I l l . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY THE LAW CORRECTLY TO
THE FACTS AT HAND.

The Appellees are focusing on "genuine issues of material fact". This was
not the basis for the court's ruling. The court issued its ruling based upon its
understanding of the law, not based upon a genuine issue of material fact.
Therefore, the court should review the legal theory adopted by the trial court and
determine whether or not that was appropriate. If that was not appropriate then the
ruling on the motion for summary judgment should be reversed.

This Court

should then remand for further proceedings consistent with a corrected ruling on
the motion for summary judgment.
It is clear that Weber County did not even attempt to provide notice of the
tax sale to Appellant. This alone should invalidate the tax sale. Weber County is
under an absolute strict duty to follow the procedures outlined in the code.

See,

Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1938).
To be valid, a tax sale must be conducted according to the strict requirements of
the governing statutes. See, Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah 2d 208, 487 P.2d 861, 862
(1971), see also, Massey v. Griffiths, 131 P.3d 243 (Utah 2005). Weber County

5

did not provide notice, nor does it state that it even attempted to provide notice to
Diamond T. Developments, Inc. R. 37. Therefore, because the tax sale was
inappropriate, the court should allow for Diamond T. Developments, Inc., even in
its dissolved state, to challenge that sale. Defendant fails to address the issue of
whether or not an involuntarily dissolved entity has the ability to challenge a tax
sale. Rather, Defendants seeks to divert the court's attention to other irrelevant
factors.

When all is said and done, the tax sale did not follow the proper

procedure for lack of notice and the Appellees cannot defend that improper
procedure. The only question is whether or not Diamond T. Developments, Inc.,
as a dissolved entity can challenge that issue.

The trial court decided that

Diamond T. Developments, Inc. could not so challenge it. However, as is set forth
in this brief and in Appellant's opening brief, significant case law and statutory
law allows for a dissolved corporation to enforce its contractual rights in a quiet
title lawsuit.

This means that this Court should correct the trial court's

understanding of the law and allow for the trial court to proceed consistent
therewith rather than inconsistent therewith.

IV . THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF CONTRACT RIGHTS IS NOT AN
ATTEMPT TO RAISE A NEW ISSUE.

Appellees seek to persuade this court that the issue of whether or not the
contractual rights of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. as a dissolved corporation
has been transferred to its principals and/or allow the principals to have been
6

substituted into the action to enforce the contractual rights is not a new issue. The
court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment effectively precluded any
discussion of such issues and therefore, Appellant is merely showing the Court
that a potentially important issue has been ignored because of the effect of the
ruling. Plaintiffs do not seek to ask this court to address that issue but seek for this
court to reverse the court's ruling on the appealed issue. This is a legal theory that
was foreclosed from being addressed at the trial court level and which should be
considered as a possible issued to potentially be raised at the trial court level after
proper resolution of the motion for summary judgment. See, Wayment v. Howard,
144 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Utah 2006) (finding that theories foreclosed from being
addressed at trial by a denial of a motion for summary judgment may be heard on
appeal).
CONCLUSION

The legal issue on appeal is the application of the law concerning the
ability of a dissolved entity to challenge the validity of a tax sale in a quiet title
action. Appellees have failed to respond to this issue. Instead, Appellees have
raised other issues which do not affect the point of law which the Court is
requested to resolve. Because there is no compelling argument to the contrary,
Appellant's argument concerning the status of a dissolved entity carries more
weight and should be adopted by this Court. This means that this Court should

7

overturn the decision of the trial court concerning status of the dissolved entity and
remanded for further proceedings.

DATED this 9^_ day of May, 2008.

I. Darin Hammond
Attorneys for Appellant
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